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Abstract
This paper evaluates the overall safety of public transit, taking into account all risks, 
including recent terrorist attacks. It indicates that transit is an extremely safe mode, 
with total per-passenger-mile fatality rates approximately one-tenth that of automo-
bile travel. It is important for individuals and public oﬃcials to avoid overreacting to 
terrorist threats in ways that increase overall danger. Transit terrorism would cause 
more total casualties and harm to society if individuals respond to attacks by shift-
ing from public transit to less safe modes, or if decision makers respond by reducing 
support for public transit. 
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, 
unjustiﬁed terror which paralyzes needed eﬀorts to convert retreat into 
advance.”  —Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932 Presidential Inaugural Address
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On July 7, 2005, terrorist bombs on London’s transit system killed approximately 
50 people and injured hundreds. This is not the ﬁrst terrorist attack on public tran-
sit. In 1995, a religious group released sarin gas in Tokyo’s subway system, killing 12 
and making thousands of people sick. In recent years, bombs exploded on buses 
and trains in Israel, Madrid, Moscow, Paris and other cities. 
Despite such events, public transit is still an extremely safe form of travel. The traf-
ﬁc fatality rate per passenger-kilometer is less than one-tenth that of automobile 
travel, as indicated in ﬁgures 1 through 3 (the analysis for these graph is in the 
Transit Risk spreadsheet, available from the Victoria Transport Policy Institute 
website at www.vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls). Even including terrorist attacks and other 
crimes against transit passengers, transit is far safer than private vehicle travel.
Figure 1. U.K. Death Rate by Mode 
Source: (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005, Table 7.3)
Note: UK transit passengers have about one-twentieth the traﬃc fatality rate as 
automobile occupants.
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Figure 2. U.S. Death Rate by Mode 
 
Source: (BTS, Tables 2-1 and 2-4; APTA, 2003)
Note: U.S. transit passengers have about one-tenth the traﬃc fatality rate as automobile 
occupants.
Figure 3. Canadian Death Rate by Mode 
 
Source: (CUTA, 2000)
Note: Canadian transit passengers have about one-tenth the traﬃc fatality rate as auto-
mobile occupants.
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Figures 1 through 3 show only risks to transit passengers. Transit accidents also 
impose “external” risks on other road users (motorists, pedestrians and cyclists), 
but the marginal external risk of an additional transit passenger-kilometer is 
small, since most transit systems have excess capacity (only if additional ridership 
requires additional transit vehicles would external risk increase) and automobile 
travel imposes comparable external risks. For more discussion of marginal transit 
risk, see Litman 2005a and 2005b.
Shifting travel from automobile to transit and creating more transit-oriented 
communities increases safety for transit passengers and other road users. Total 
per-capita traﬃc fatality rates (including automobile, transit and pedestrian 
deaths) tend to decline as transit ridership increases in a community, as indicated 
in Figure 4. The decline in traﬃc fatalities associated with increased transit use 
probably results from a combination of reduced per-capita annual vehicle mile-
age, lower average traﬃc speeds in higher-density areas, and reduced driving by 
higher-risk motorists, such as teenagers and habitual drunk drivers, due to better 
alternatives to automobile travel. Transit is a signiﬁcant contributor to each of 
these factors.
Figure 4. Trafﬁc Deaths and Transit Mileage,  
U.S. Cities (based on FTA data)
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Residents of more transit-oriented urban regions experience far lower per-capita 
traﬃc fatality rates than in automobile-oriented regions, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
Overall, transit passengers are much safer than motorists, and residents of transit-
oriented communities are safer than residents of automobile-oriented communi-
ties, even taking into account risks from murder and terrorism (Lucy 2002).
Figure 5. Annual Per Capita Trafﬁc Deaths 
Source: Litman, 2004
Note: Transit-oriented urban regions have signiﬁcantly lower 
per-capita traﬃc fatality rates than more automobile-oriented 
cities. “Most Transit Oriented” are the 10 U.S. cities with the 
highest per-capita annual transit mileage (333 to 1,004 annual 
transit passenger miles). “Mixed” are the next 20 cities ranked 
by transit mileage (118 to 254 annual transit passenger miles). 
“Most Automobile Oriented” are the remainder (15 to 114 
annual transit passenger-miles).
International data also indicate that per-capita traffic fatalities decline with 
increased transit ridership, as indicated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. International Trafﬁc Deaths 
Source: (Kenworthy and Laube, 2000) 
Annual road and rail traﬃc deaths total 286 in the London region, about 3,500 in 
the U.K., and more than 43,000 in the U.S., of which only a small portion involve 
public transit passengers, as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Trafﬁc Fatality Data Summary 
Source: (TfL, 2004; DfT, 2004; BTS, 2004) 
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Of the 286 transportation fatalities in London, only 5.6 percent involved public 
transport passengers, although public transport provides 24.2 percent of total pas-
senger trips and 20.1 percent of passenger-kilometers, as indicated in Table 2. 
Table 2. London Area 2003 Travel and Fatalities By Mode 
Source: (TfL, 2004)
If public transit had the same fatality rate per passenger-mile as automobile travel, 
there would have been 104 more deaths in London, 300 in the U.K., and 148 in the 
U.S. in 2003 (calculations in www.vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls). These are lower-bound 
estimates because they assume that each transit passenger-mile replaces just one 
automobile passenger-mile. However, when people shift from driving to transit, 
they tend to reduce their annual mileage, because transit users often choose closer 
destinations and avoid unnecessary trips. As public transit ridership increases in a 
community, per-capita vehicle ownership tends to decline, and land use patterns 
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become more accessible and walkable, further reducing vehicle mileage. Described 
diﬀerently, as a community becomes more automobile-oriented, destinations 
tend to disperse, due, in part, to the need to dedicate more land to roads and 
parking facilities, causing people to travel more to maintain a given level of acces-
sibility. 
As a result, each transit passenger-mile often replaces several automobile vehicle-
miles (Litman 2004). This is one of the reasons that increased per capita transit 
ridership provides such large reduction in per-capita traffic fatality rates, as 
indicated earlier. If residents of the “Transit Oriented” regions described earlier 
in Figure 5 had the same traﬃc fatality rate as the “Automobile-Oriented,” there 
would be about 2,500 additional traﬃc fatalities in the U.S. (calculations in www.
vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls).
These safety beneﬁts of transit are much larger than deaths and injuries caused by 
recent terrorist attacks. In addition, public transit provides other health beneﬁts, 
by reducing air pollution and increasing physical exercise, since most transit trips 
involve walking or cycling links. Although these health beneﬁts are diﬃcult to 
quantify, they appear to be large, indicating far greater total health beneﬁts from 
transit and, therefore, much larger disbeneﬁts when people shift from transit to 
driving (Litman 2003). Travelers would increase their total risk if they shift from 
transit to driving in response to terrorist threats.
Transit risks tend to receive more attention than automobile risks. Because they 
are rare, incidents that kill or injure a few transit passengers often receive national 
or international media attention, while automobile crashes that kill a few people 
are so common they are considered local news, and injury accidents often receive 
no media coverage at all. For example, in 1995 the death of three passengers in a 
Toronto subway crash was widely reported in British Columbia. The same week, 
the death of four teenagers in a car crash was a local news story without media 
coverage in Toronto. This suggests that a transit passenger death receives about 
100 times as much media coverage as an automobile passenger death. 
Traﬃc accidents actually represents a much greater risk than terrorism (Adams 
2005):
• On an average day, 9 people die and over 800 are injured in British road 
accidents. The July 7 London terrorist deaths represent about six days of 
normal traﬃc fatalities.
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• The 191 people killed March 11, 2004, by Madrid bombers were equivalent 
to about 12 or 13 days of normal traﬃc deaths in Spain. 
• During the 25 worst years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, twice 
as many people died there in road accidents as were killed by terrorists. 
• In Israel, the annual road traﬃc death toll has been two or three times higher 
than civilian deaths by Palestinian terrorists during the violent years of 2000 
through 2003.
• The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks killed about the same number 
of people as a typical month of U.S. traﬃc accidents. According to oﬃcial 
reports, terrorists killed 25 Americans worldwide in 2002, 23 in 2003, and 
none in 2004, while about 42,000 Americans died in traﬃc accidents each 
of these years.
There are several reasons that people react particularly strongly to terrorist attacks 
(Adams 2005). Such attacks are designed to be highly visible, producing intense 
media coverage. The fact that the harm they cause is intentional rather than acci-
dental makes them particularly tragic and frustrating. And they raise fears that 
such attacks may become more frequent or severe, so risks may increase in the 
future. For these reasons, it is not surprising that transit terrorism tends to instill 
more fear than other risks that are actually much greater overall. That is exactly 
what terrorists intend.
This is not to suggest that transit terrorism risks are insigniﬁcant and should be 
ignored. On the contrary, transit terrorism is a serious threat that harms people 
both directly, through injury and property damage, and indirectly by creating fear 
and confusion. Strong action is justiﬁed to protect transit users’ safety and sense 
of security. 
Society should work aggressively to prevent terrorists attacks, respond to inci-
dents, and bring terrorists to justice. Transportation professionals, and transit 
operators and users should be cautious and vigilant (for more discussion of strate-
gies for increasing transit security, see the “Address Security Concerns” chapter 
of the VTPI Online TDM Encyclopedia at www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm37.htm). Many 
transport organizations are currently working to increase transit security (APTA, 
2005; FTA, 2005; MTI, 2005; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2005). Much more can be done. The 
federal government spent $22 billion—more than $9 per passenger—on air trans-
portation security after September 11, 2001 attacks, but less than 1¢ per passenger 
to increase railway and subway security (Howitt and Makler 2005).
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But it is important for individuals and public oﬃcials to take all risks into account 
and avoid overreacting to transit terrorism risks in ways that increase overall dan-
ger. Transit terrorism would cause greater total casualties and harm to society if 
individual travelers respond to exaggerated fears by shifting from public transit 
to less safe modes, or if decision makers respond by reducing support for public 
transit. 
Such shifts have occurred. Analysis by Gigerenzer (2004) and Sivak and Flannagan 
(2004) indicate that in the three months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, shifts from air to automobile travel caused several hundred additional 
roadway traﬃc fatalities. Since air travel is safer per mile than driving, particularly 
on rural roads, total travel deaths increased. Had these trends continued for more 
than a year, the additional deaths would have exceeded the September 11 terror-
ist deaths. Because of actions by governments and the airline industry to increase 
air travel security, these travel shifts have been reduced, reducing excess traﬃc 
deaths.
After a high-proﬁle transit accident or attack, news reporters sometimes stick a 
microphone in front of transit riders and ask, “How can you possibly continue 
using transit after what just happened?” with the implication that riding transit is 
dangerous and foolish. This reﬂects the myopic tendency of news media to con-
sider just one issue at a time. But people and policy makers must balance many 
factors, including overall safety, eﬃciency, and aﬀordability. It would be foolish for 
travelers to reduce their transit travel in response to a terrorist attack, despite the 
fact that transit is an extremely safe mode of travel and provides other beneﬁts to 
users and society.
When terrorist attacks occur, responsible leaders rightfully recommend that 
people return to their normal habits, including public transit travel. Cities repair 
their public transit systems and people use them, both for practical reasons and 
to show they are not intimidated by terrorism. 
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